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In December 2008 I attended one of the Hamlyn Lectures, delivered in Edinburgh by Dame Hazel Genn. Her
topic was 'Civil Justice and ADR' but she quickly made it clear that her main interest, or target, was
mediation. I readied myself for a verbal assault, and got one, but in more trenchant terms than I expected.
While there was nothing new in Professor Genn's litany of mediation's failings, I was startled and a bit stung
by the rhetorical flourish with which it was uttered, particularly in the presence of distinguished members of
the Scottish judiciary and legal profession. A review of civil justice is currently being conducted by Lord Gill,
Scotland's second most senior judge, and it would be surprising if her remarks went unnoticed. This article is
an attempt to respond, not by defending mediation, but rather by challenging mediators to re-think the way
they describe what they do.
We generally listen to senior academics respectfully, ascribing a degree of dispassionate objectivity. But
Professor Genn did seem to 'have it in for' mediators. It was a little surprising to hear her address the
question: 'How many new professions benefit from the support of the senior judiciary?' to the very old
profession that receives that support daily. However, her most striking assertion was this: 'Mediators have no
interest in justice and fairness'. It was the culmination of a theme: contrasting well-meaning but ineffectual
mediators, focused on relationships, with robust judges, vindicating people's rights; low demand for
mediation despite attempts by government and judges to promote it; and low levels of satisfaction when it is
mandated. A sorry tale indeed.
What has this to do with social norms? Well, it led me to muse on mediation rhetoric. I make the following
assertion: mediation rhetoric is often out of step with mediation practice. Indifference to norms like justice
and fairness may still feature in mediation rhetoric but I believe it ignores the 'facts on the ground' of daily
practice. This phenomenon allows observers to seize on mediation's strengths, such as support for party
self-determination, and characterise them as failings.
I add a second, related, assertion: mediators' ethical codes offer little help. As one academic puts it:
'Mediating ethically requires the constant generation of internal norms appropriate for a specific mediation
and set of parties' (J MacFarlane, 'Mediating Ethically: the Limits of Codes of Conduct and the Potential of a
Reflective Practice Model' (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 49 at p 52). I consider below where these
norms might come from.
Finally, I link this difficulty with codes to the moment-by-moment ethical choices mediators make. If I have 'no
interest in justice and fairness', what on earth am I doing when I intervene in other people's disputes? I
suggest that, when faced with truly difficult dilemmas, mediators find guidance neither in models nor ethical
frameworks. Rather they fall back on their core values. It is instructive to consider what these might be.
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The 'norm-generating' model
To return to the question of mediation rhetoric, it is helpful to start with a typology of mediation practice set
out in 1997 by Ellen Waldman. It ranks mediation models according to their treatment of social norms.
Answering Carrie Menkel-Meadow's question: 'Are third parties, like mediators, ever morally responsible for
the outcomes they preside over?' (C Menkel-Meadow et al, What's Fair? Ethics for Negotiators,
(Jossey-Bass, 2004) at p xvi), the 'classic' form of mediation responds with a clear no: 'disputants are
encouraged to generate the norms that will guide the resolution to their dispute' (E Waldman, 'Identifying the
Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model Approach' (1997) 48 Hastings Law Journal 703-769 at p
708). While a mediator gets busy managing process and interaction, 'he does not restrain deliberations by
referencing concerns extrinsic to the parties' (ibid at p 718). The norms by which choices are evaluated must
come from the parties themselves: the norm-generating model.
What are social norms? They are: 'The rules that a group uses for appropriate and inappropriate values,
beliefs, attitudes and behaviours' (www.changingminds.org). This definition embraces the law but is by no
means limited to it. Early twentieth century judges used 'the man on the Clapham omnibus', as a kind of
normative standard but social norms applicable in disputes might include 'reasonableness' and 'the way
children ought to be brought up'. They could also include simple ideas like turn-taking, not interrupting and, of
course, fairness.
The norm-generating model will be familiar to mediators. Most were trained in some version of it, reflected in
mediation ideals like empowerment and respect. Waldman (prefiguring Professor Genn) claims:
'The leitmotif of the norm-generating model, then, is its inattention to social norms. In an effort to spur innovative
problem-solving, the model situates party discussion in a normative tabula rasa' (ibid at p 718).
This model is particularly suitable where legal norms do not apply, or are unclear, or where mediation's
primary goal is improving relationship. 'Norm-generating' mediators would not regard it as appropriate for
their values, no matter how important, to supplant those of the parties.
Norm-educating
Moving along Waldman's taxonomy, we come next to the 'norm-educating' model, portrayed as a result of
mediation's expansion into new, more legal areas and to criticism that the norm-generating approach fails to
uphold standards of fairness and justice. The mediator exercises a more forceful role, adding to her standard
repertoire of facilitative techniques the option of 'educating' the parties about the norms that may apply to
their situation. S/he may not, however, tell the parties what to do -- the choice to apply these norms remains
with them:
'Contrary to the norm-generating model, where discussion of societal standards is thought to impede autonomy and
distract parties from their true needs, this model's consideration of social norms is thought to enhance autonomy by
enabling parties to make the most informed decisions possible' (ibid at p 732).
The archetypal norm-educating process is family mediation. Family mediators refer to a number of social
norms. Chief of these is the welfare of children, which spawns others on topics like patterns of contact, the
importance of a relationship with both parents and the place of children's views. As well as these
child-oriented norms, mediators may invoke legal rules. All Issues Mediation seems further along this
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continuum, with reference made to legislation, particularly by lawyer mediators (J Lewis, The Role of
Mediation in Family Disputes, Scottish Office Central Research Unit, 1999). Waldman is not the only one to
notice this: Robert Dingwall and David Greatbatch assert that mediators have: 'Some sense of an acceptable
bracket of outcomes, "the parameters of the permissible", to the case which they are dealing with and will
seek to manage the process to ensure that any eventual agreement falls within this bracket' (R Dingwall and
D Greatbatch, 'The Mediation Process' in G Davis et al, Monitoring Publicly Funded Family Mediation, (Legal
Services Commission, 2000) at p 251).
The norm-educating style seems prevalent in other fields, including court-annexed mediation and mediation
in the construction industry (S Belhorn, 'Settling Beyond the Shadow of the Law: How Mediation Can Make
the Most of Social Norms' (2005) 20 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 981-1026). It boasts the
capacity to protect weaker or less articulate parties because the normative framework provides a backstop to
ensure fairness. However, all this educating does not mean that parties have to do what the mediator says:
party self-determination remains a driving value and they may still choose to ignore the mediator's normative
guidance.
Norm advocating
Waldman posits a third model. Here, the mediator not only informs the parties about norms, but ensures they
are observed. Her example involves a 'bioethics mediator' facilitating an intensive care team's discussion
about a patient's decision to terminate treatment (thus ensuring her death). In this end-of-life mediation, the
mediator uses some standard mediation techniques like agenda setting and option exploration. However:
'The mediator not only educated the parties about the relevant legal and ethical norms, but also insisted on their
incorporation into the agreement. In this sense, her role extended beyond that of an educator; she became, to some
degree, a safeguarder of social norms and values' (Waldman, at p 745, above).
While some of her examples -- zoning, environmental and bioethical disputes -- may be unfamiliar in the UK,
I believe we see a form of norm-advocating in disability discrimination mediation: 'It enables people to
exercise the same rights as they would in court but through a less rigid and more widely focussed approach.
We describe this as rights-based conciliation.' (www.dcs-gb.net)
Mediation rhetoric
My point is a simple one: mediation rhetoric still, by and large, features the norm-generating model while, in
practice, much UK mediation has become norm-educating or even norm-advocating. Dingwall and
Greatbatch are not alone in claiming that family mediators are now quite sophisticated in highlighting legal
and societal norms. In 1999, Jane Lewis identified 'guidance from mediators' as among the benefits identified
by Scottish mediation parties (Lewis, at p 58, above). One mediator said 'If they are flying against the
principles of law then I would see my role as just reminding them again how the law looks at the matter'
(Lewis, p 59, above). But if we turn to rhetoric, the Family Mediation Helpline website, for example, is quite
categorical:
'Sometimes the mediator will suggest a way of solving a problem to help them to reach an agreement acceptable to
both, but they will never tell either party what to do' (www.familymediationhelpline.co.uk).
Although the mediator may have a problem-solving input, there is no hint of normative guidance --
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'acceptability' is the sole criterion for outcomes. The Relationships Scotland website is clearer: 'Mediators
avoid taking sides, making judgements or giving guidance' (www.relationships-scotland.org.uk). Interestingly,
the same words are used to describe court annexed mediation: 'Mediators avoid taking sides, making
judgements or giving guidance.' (www.nationalmediationhelpline.com).
So, the role of social norms in mediation is under-acknowledged, yet crucial to the moment-by-moment
choices mediators make. If mediators do care about fairness and justice, and if we bring these and other
norms to our clients' attention, why do we not say so? On the face of our publicity, we take little responsibility
for ensuring that agreements conform to social norms. And yet, at the same time, a widespread critique has
evolved, highlighting mediator pressure to reach particular results, (Greatbatch and Dingwall, above; T Grillo,
'The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women' (1991) 100 Yale Law Review pp 1545-1610) --
almost the opposite phenomenon. This conundrum illustrates the trickiness at the heart of mediation. Do we
influence people, or do we not? Do mediation outcomes need to be fair, or is that 'a very subjective matter' (J
Folger, Seminar on Transformative Mediation, unpublished, Institute of Family Therapy, London, 2006)?
These are ethical questions, and we might expect to find answers to them in our codes of professional
ethics.
Limitations of ethical codes
Canadian academic Julie MacFarlane has considered the difficulty of applying ethical codes to mediation.
She contrasts mediators with adjudicators, who are constrained by both substantive and procedural rules. In
the absence of such normative guidelines, 'the mediator must pay attention to every aspect of party
interaction in the course of their negotiations, and assumes a very broad responsibility for the ... process that
unfolds' (MacFarlane, at p 51, above). Because of the complexity of this activity MacFarlane argues that
'bright-line' standards like impartiality are unwieldy and inappropriate. Instead, she claims that: 'implicit in
each decision is a balancing of alternate courses of action and an appraisal of how far each advances the
goals and the mediator's understanding of the underlying values of the mediation process' (MacFarlane, at p
57, above). This requires mediator discretion. These 'on-the-spot judgments' (MacFarlane, at p 53, above)
are not only invisible to the parties: mediators themselves may not recognise the moral reasoning that led
them to make to one choice over another. To ensure that mediators exercise their discretion in ethical ways,
MacFarlane suggests that 'reflective practice' (D Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think
in Action New York, Basic Books, 1983) is more useful than ethical codes.
Her criticism of codes of conduct goes further. First, their focus on process 'obscures the dynamic
relationship between the process and content of dialogue in mediation' (ibid at p 61). Key ethical issues like
fairness and justice seem to concern content -- the 'substantive justice' of outcomes -- more than process.
Second, a right-wrong paradigm ignores the reality of discretion. For example, the idea of ensuring that the
less powerful party is not disadvantaged assumes that 'powerful' and 'powerless' are fixed and immutable
states. In my experience, the balance of power shifts constantly throughout a session, and mediator
responses are sophisticated, intuitive decisions, made in the moment. And finally, ethical codes offer little
guidance in the face of competing principles, such as party self-determination and the protection of
vulnerable parties from undue pressure.
All of this underlines the inadequacy of these codes to address the nuances of conflict resolution. It seems
unrealistic, MacFarlane claims, 'to imagine that the personal awareness of mediators who are slow to
recognise the signs of intimidation and domination will be affected by a standard in a code of conduct'
(MacFarlane, at p 71, above).
Mediation's values
This critique affirms my own instinct, that while ethical codes need to exist (they seem to reassure people)
what is much more relevant in the moment-by-moment choices that mediators have to make are their values.
By values I mean something deeper and broader than rules: rather, explanatory principles that allow a range
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of subsidiary choices to be made almost automatically (saving time and brain power). A simple example is
politeness: if I hold this value, I do not need a list when I leave the house saying: 'Don't barge in front of
people; give your seat up to the elderly; allow others to speak first' etc. I have sufficient guidance for most of
the micro-choices I need to make. In the same way, I contend that mediation's values would be both
descriptive and prescriptive. They would tell us how mediators are likely to behave while also telling
mediators how they ought to behave.
It is beyond the scope of this article to set out what mediation's values might be (C Irvine, Mediation's Values:
An Examination of the Values Behind Five Mediation Texts, Unpublished Masters Dissertation, Birkbeck
College, University of London, 2007). My point is simply that it is these, often unarticulated, drivers that affect
mediators' moment-by-moment choices. I therefore suggest it is the duty of anyone who dares to intervene in
other people's conflict to examine their own values. And I challenge mediators to reflect: what is mediation
for? Do we care about justice and fairness? Or is empowerment more important? If there is a contradiction
between values such as these, how do we resolve it?
Other questions could be asked: is mediation concerned with social justice? If so, how is this ensured, and
will such attempts clash with other mediation values, like autonomy and self-determination? Is mediation a
child of the Enlightenment, relying on human rationality, individualism and moral neutrality? Is personal
choice the value that trumps all others in mediation? If not, how should we modify our rhetoric to warn clients
that we may attempt to limit that choice?
Conclusion
To return to Professor Genn, she is in a way doing mediators a favour. By presenting us in our most feeble
light, she shocks us into re-thinking what we say about ourselves. If we can bring our rhetoric more closely
into line with practice, that must be more honourable and better for clients. If we are 'norm-educating' or even
'norm-advocating' practitioners, let us say so, and even go further and spell out what these norms are. By
owning our considerable moral authority, and accepting that by and large we use it for good, we also address
the equal and opposite critique of mediators exercising their power unseen and unacknowledged.
We cannot expect to rebut critics by relying on our ethical codes. We have to develop a reflective practice
that enables us to learn from the myriad critical moments in mediation, and develop theories that are
grounded in that reality. We owe it to our clients not only to know what to do, but why we do it, so that our
choices are motivated by more than intuition or expediency.
Reflective practice will in turn enable us to work out what are our values: the fundamental principles that
guide our particular mediation 'moves'. We are a long way from a definitive list, but I suspect respect will be
there, along with non-violence and a commitment to giving people 'voice'. The attempt to articulate a more
comprehensive set of values will surely improve both the standard and the reputation of mediation.
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